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Abstract
This paper, prepared for "The Future of Organized Labor in America"
symposium at Wayne State University Law School, examines two
questions: 1) what are the implications of the decline of unions for the
future of labor law, and 2) what are the implications of labor law for the
decline of unions? After documenting the recent trends (decline in the
private sector coupled with slight growth in the public sector), I argue that
the change in the public-versus-private composition will lead unions to
pursue legislative strategies that will further reduce the share of the privatesector workforce in unions. A law reform program that has any chance of
success in reversing the decline of private-sector unions will have to aim to
reduce the competitive disadvantage to firms from unionization. I offer two
general proposals in this vein: 1) making labor law more predictable and 2)
removing the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) from
regulating the substantive terms of labor contracts.

t Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar, Boston University, Boston, MA, 02215;
knhylton@bu.edu. This paper was prepared for a symposium titled "The Future of
Organized Labor in America," held at Wayne State University Law School, April 11, 2003.
I benefited from comments at the conference by Professor Harry Hutchison and Professor
William Gould. I thank Shafaq Islam for research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A student of labor law should be reluctant to make predictions about the
future of unions.' The law, by itself, does not tell us much about how unions
will fare. To be sure, the law serves instrumentalist purposes, but these
purposes are narrow and dependent on the legal issues involved in each case
that helps define it. Since labor law does not aim exclusively to promote
unions, studying labor law should be of little use in predicting the rise or
fall of unions over the long term.
The central and inescapable fact of American unionism in our time is
decline. After reaching a high of 35 percent in 1953, private-sectorunion
density, i.e., the percentage of private-sector workers in unions, has fallen
continuously to its current level of 9 percent.2 There is no obvious reason
to believe that this decline will not continue in the foreseeable future. No
one contends that law is totally irrelevant to the future of unions, though
there is a lively debate about its importance in arresting their decline. 3 1 will
focus here on two questions: 1) what are the implications of the decline of
unions for the law, and 2) what are the implications of the law for the
decline of unions? In other words, how is "union decline" likely to change
our employment and labor laws, and is it possible for the law to reverse or
slow the decline in union density?

1. I confess to having spent a lot of time studying labor law cases. Most of my work has
tried to provide a positive economic theory of labor law doctrine. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton,
An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain, 83 GEO. L.J. 19 (1993); Keith N. Hylton, A
Theory of Minimum ContractTerms, with ImplicationsforLaborLaw, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1741

(1996) [hereinafter Minimum Terms]; Keith N. Hylton, Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 Nw.
U. L. REV. 471 (1993); Keith N. Hylton & Maria O'Brien Hylton, Rational Decisionsand
Regulation of Union Entry, 34 VILL. L. REV. 145 (1989); Keith N. Hylton & Maria O'Brien
Hylton, Rent Appropriationandthe LaborLaw DoctrineofSuccessorship,70 B.U. L. REV.

821 (1990).
2. Seymour Martin Lipset & Ivan Katchanovsky, The Future of PrivateSector Unions
in the U.S., in JAMES T. BENNETT & BRUCE E. KAUFMAN, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SECTOR

UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 9, 10 (2002).
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW (1993); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep:

Securing Workers' Rights Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983); Robert J.
LaLonde and Bernard D. Meltzer, HardTimesfor Unions:Another Look at the Significance
of Employer Illegalities, 58 U CHI. L. REV. 953 (1991). The most rigorous examination of
the relative importance of labor law is HENRY S. FARBER & BRUCE WESTERN, ROUND UP
THE USUAL SUSPECTS: THE DECLINE OF UNIONS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 1973-1998

(Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, Working Paper No. 437 2000); see also

Henry S. Farber & Bruce Western, Ronald Reagan and the Politics of Declining Union
Organization,40 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 385 (2002).
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II. DECLINE

Table I presents statistics on private and public-sector union density in
1983 and 2000. The basic message of decline is conveyed by the first cell
of the table, showing private and public-sector densities for the nation as a
whole. The private-sector union density fell from 16.5 in 1983 to 9 percent
in 2000, a decline of 45 percent. The public-sector union density increased
modestly from 36.7 to 37.5 percent, a rise of 2 percent.
Union density statistics for the nation show that private-sector unions
shrank substantially from 1983 to 2000. In the public sector, unions
experienced a slight gain. Thus, use of the word "decline" to describe the
experience of unions should be understood to apply to the private sector.
There is no evidence of decline in the public sector.
Union density data for the whole nation mask inter-regional shifts that
can be observed only by looking at the data on a state-by-state level. The
remaining cells of Table 1 permit us to examine state-level changes in union
density in addition to inter-regional shifts in organization rates.
TABLE

State

14

1983

2000

% Diff

Priv.

Pub.

Priv.

Pub.

Priv.

Pub.

All States
Alabama

16.5
15.3

36.7
23.5

9.0
5.8

37.5
29.5

-45
-62

+2
+25

Alaska

17.3

41.6

12.8

43.3

-26

+4

Arizona

8.6

25.9

4.2

18.0

-51

-30

Arkansas

10.2

14.3

4.0

14.6

-61

+2

California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.

17.7
11.2
16.7
15.9
15.2

43.4
24.1
62.9
41.6
26.1

9.7
6.0
9.4
8.9
9.5

50.3
25.8
62.4
38.9
28.0

-45
-46
-44
-44
-37

+16
+7
0
-6
+7

Florida
Georgia

7.1
11.1

27.4
15.4

3.3
4.6

28.5
16.1

-53
-58

+4
+4

Hawaii

21.9

51.6

14.4

61.7

-34

+2

Idaho

10.3

20.5

5.5

17.4

-47

-1

Illinois

21.5

38.4

14.1

46.9

-34

+22

4. The figures for "All States" come from the U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract
ofthe United States, 2000, Table No. 712, availableat http://www.census.gov. State figures
come from Barry Hirsch & David Macpherson, UnionMembership andCoverage Database
from the CurrentPopulation Survey, at http://www.unionstats.com. Figures represent the

percentage of each state's nonagricultural wage and salary employees who are union
members.
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State
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

1983
Priv.
Pub.
25.0
24.4
14.6
26.5
12.2
20.1
18.2
16.7
11.0
23.5
14.2
50.3
14.4
29.9
17.6
60.4
25.3
56.8
17.1
51.4
9.0
13.2
14.8
30.1
9.7
29.0
19.6
39.0
7.5
35.8
21.1
55.8
10.1
15.6
24.0
69.3
5.4
17.9
9.5
25.6
22.5
39.3
9.1
21.8
16.4
46.3
23.2
51.4
13.7
68.1
3.9
14.3
8.0
22.6
12.4
28.2
8.1
18.6
11.3
30.3
6.7
45.4
10.2
16.6
22.0
47.9
26.1
22.0
19.8
44.6
10.4
23.6

2000
Priv.
Pub.
13.1
31.5
10.5
29.6
8.0
13.3
10.1
22.0
5.5
14.8
8.0
46.7
7.8
36.7
7.9
55.4
15.7
53.9
12.3
53.7
5.4
9.0
8.2
33.8
4.6
27.2
13.8
39.6
6.3
37.4
13.1
62.4
5.5
15.7
15.3
70.6
2.4
11.1
3.7
16.4
49.0
12.3
4.4
16.8
9.8
53.8
11.2
54.7
9.9
68.5
2.8
10.0
2.5
18.5
21.4
6.7
3.8
16.3
4.5
21.6
5.1
39.5
3.9
12.2
11.8
48.1
12.4
23.2
55.4
11.7
5.5
16.8

[Vol. 49:685
% Diff
Priv.
Pub.
-45
+29
-28
+12
-34
-34
-44
+32
-50
-37
-44
-7
-46
+23
-55
-8
-38
-5
-28
+4
-48
-32
-45
+12
-53
-6
+1
-30
-16
+4
-38
+12
-45
0
-36
+2
-55
-38
-61
-34
-45
+25
-52
-23
-40
+16
-52
+6
-28
0
-28
-30
-69
-18
-46
-24
-53
-12
-60
-29
-24
-13
-62
-26
-46
0
+5
-52
-41
+24
-47
-29

Public-sector union density rates show a mixed pattern in Table 1,
increasing in slightly more than half of the states while falling in 21 of
them. The state-level figures show precisely why the overall increase in
public-sector union density since 1983 is only 2 percent: public-sector
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unions have gained in roughly half the states and lost in the other half.
Taking a closer look, the table shows that public-sector unions have
suffered the biggest losses in the West. Public-sector densities declined
substantially in Arizona (-30 percent), North Dakota (-34 percent), South
Dakota (-18 percent), Oklahoma (-23 percent), Texas (-12 percent), Utah
(-29 percent), and Wyoming (-29 percent). Outside of the West, losses in
the public sector have been shared evenly among the South, Northeast, and
Midwest.
Private-sector union density rates show a uniform pattern of decline in
all states. To be sure, private-sector unions have done less badly in some
states than in others, but the consistent pattern of losses suggests a bleak
future. The largest decline in the private-sector density is observed in South
Dakota, where there has been nearly a 70 percent drop. The smallest decline
is observed in New Hampshire, at 16 percent. But New Hampshire's
starting point in the sample, its 1983 private-sector density of 7.5 percent,
was relatively small.
Among regions, private-sector density rates have fallen most in the
West and the South. Private-sector densities in the South now average less
than 5 percent. Unions failed to hold their ground in all sectors. However,
unions fared better in the Northeast (see, e.g., Rhode Island, Vermont, New
York, New Hampshire, New Jersey) than in the other regions; most of the
northeastern states experienced declines that were less than the national
decline of 45 percent. The big exceptions in the Northeast were Maine and
Massachusetts, both experiencing large declines in the private sector (-44
percent and -55 percent respectively).

III. IMPLICATIONS OF DECLINE FOR LAW
A. Statutory Law
The decline of private-sector unionism is likely to make efforts to
change statutory law a more important part of the labor movement.
Organized labor, interpreted broadly, has always shifted between alternative
strategies of promoting its interests. One strategy, political activism,
involves lobbying and promoting laws that benefit workers. The other
strategy, Samuel Gompers's "voluntarism," emphasizes decentralized
collective bargaining. The period from roughly 1935 to 1981, when the
private-sector union density rate exceeded 15 percent, represents the high
point of the voluntarism period. Today's private-sector union density of 9
percent is closer to the long-run historical norm since 1850.
Given the enormous difficulty unions have today in controlling wage
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competition in any substantial industry, the legislative front will have to
appear more attractive as a means of securing benefits for their constituents.
It follows that with low and declining private-sector density rates, unions
have greater incentives to divert their resources toward promoting
legislation that increases labor costs for all firms (e.g., minimum wage
legislation, family leave) and reduces low-wage competition (e.g., tariff
legislation). To some extent, this is a return to the strategy of some early
species of unions, such as the Knights of Labor. These early species were
eventually overtaken by unions that operated under Gompers's voluntarism
model.
However, there is a significant problem with relying on legislative
action to secure greater benefits for union members. Much of the union
movement's strength has moved from the private to the public sector. Fortyfour percent of union members work in the public sector today,5 and that
percentage is increasing. This has implications for the type of legislation
unions are likely to seek.
Given the high and growing percentage of public-sector workers in the
pool of organized labor, unions are likely to put more effort in seeking
legislation that raises labor costs rather than reducing wage competition.
Why? Public-sector workers are already shielded from wage competition.
Public school teachers, for example, are not worried about losing their jobs
to private-sector teachers who are willing to work for lower pay. The public
sector really has no incentive to seek legislation that reduces competition.
While public-sector workers have no incentive to block competition,
they do have incentives to promote legislation that raises labor costs.
Indeed, their incentives are greater than those of their private-sector
counterparts for two reasons. First, the lack of competition from other firms
means that public-sector unions do not have to worry about losing work to
foreign competitors or to domestic firms that can evade the effects of costincreasing legislation. Second, if a public-sector union seeks a contract that
guarantees pay for family leave time, there is a substantial probability that
it will meet little opposition from public-sector management. After all,
public-sector managers will be looking to those very same employees for
support when they run for public office. In this process, public-sector
benefits have a secure foundation, and are likely to ratchet upward over
time.
5. See Barry Hirsch & David Macpherson, Progressof Women and Minorities in the
Illinois Workforce, T2-4, available at http://www.state.il.us (accessed from homepage by
selecting More Agencies under the Featured Agencies menu, then Labor Relations Board,
then entering the publication title in the Search field, scrolling down to Archives, and then
selecting FY 2001 (last visited July 15, 2003).
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Once public-sector unions have secured a particular benefit in the
collective bargaining agreement, they will seek to make that benefit
mandatory for the private sector as well. The reason is that once a benefit
becomes mandatory for private-sector workers, voters will not be able to
save as much by substituting private-sector workers for public-sector
workers. Efforts to privatize public services or "voucherize" government
become less attractive when private-sector costs are the same as publicsector costs.
Private-sector unions have well-known incentives to seek legislation
that increases labor costs. They are always in competition with nonunionized firms. To the extent they can raise the costs of labor for all firms,
they can reduce competition from the non-union sector. Moreover, some
types of labor-cost-increasing legislation have the effect of splitting the
votes among the business community. For example, many firms already pay
high wages, and can only gain by a law imposing a wage floor well below
what they already pay. Firms that already offer generous benefits are likely
to support, or at least have no incentive to oppose, legislation that raises
minimum benefits required by all firms.
All of this has troubling implications for the future of private-sector
unions. There will be little effort from the union movement to block
competition in the private sector, while unions (both public and private
sector) will continue, and perhaps increase, their efforts to seek legislation
that increase-s labor costs. Benefits to public-sector unions will increase in
this setting until they reach the point at which voters are no longer willing
to shoulder the burden. Benefits to private-sector workers are likely to be
far less secure in this new world.
As long as low-wage competition is permitted to flourish as it does in
this country, private-sector unions will live under the threat that their
success could be their undoing. High labor costs invite foreign competitors
to target domestic markets in internationally traded goods. If, as seems
likely, the union movement increasingly pursues a strategy of raising labor
costs without blocking competition, the end result could easily be further
and more drastic erosion in the private-sector union density.
The end result of this hypothetical legislative strategy will depend on
two factors. First, raising labor costs for all firms (e.g., minimum wages)
reduces competition from domestic low-wage competitors. That provides
a benefit to unions and enhances their growth. Second, raising labor costs
invites competition from foreign firms (think China) and domestic firms
that can evade legislatively-imposed minimum terms. This weakens unions.
The net result will depend on which of these two factors dominates. In view
of the increasing levels of trade with low-wage countries, the more probable
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event is that the latter effect dominates, weakening unions.
B. Labor Common Law
In addition to statutory law, the decline of private-sector unions has
implications for labor common-law doctrine. The first result of decline is
a loss in transactional work for labor lawyers-the work of drafting and
advising on union contracts. It is not clear that this has any implications for
the substance of labor law. First, many contract-based disputes will be
resolved within arbitration, which implies that much of the litigation that
has disappeared as a result of decline would not have been the subject of
federal court cases in any event. Second, labor law doctrine continues to
develop at a substantial pace in federal courts, in spite of the union density
decline observed over the past fifty years. This is due in part to the fact that
a relatively high percentage of labor disputes wind up in federal appellate
courts, since the NLRB resolves disputes through adjudication rather than
rule making.
The second key implication of private-sector decline is that the threat
of Supreme Court intervention is extremely small. I am not suggesting that
the Supreme Court regards labor law as less important merely because
unions have declined substantially in the private sector. That may be a
correct description of the subjective preferences of most members of the
Court, but no Court opinion has ever suggested that the Court's attention to
labor law issues is dependent on the share of the private-sector workforce
represented by unions.
The threat of Supreme Court intervention is small probably for the
following reason: Since unions are shrinking in the private sector, they are
not continually raising questions about the application of the statute in new
settings. As unions shrink, they become concentrated in their core industries
and geographical regions. These are the areas least affected by competition
from the non-union sector-indeed, this is one of the lessons suggested by
the state-level data in Table 1. These are also the areas in which most of the
really difficult labor law issues have already been settled by courts. As a
result, relatively few labor law disputes arising today show the sort of
complexity and novelty that would attract the interest ofthe Supreme Court.
What does the low threat of Supreme Court intervention imply for the
development of labor law doctrine? Since the probability of a labor law
dispute reaching the Supreme Court is extremely small, labor law will for
the most part be developed within the federal courts. The process by which
labor law develops has therefore become more decentralized. Federal
appellate courts will reach different conclusions on some issues. They will
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have a chance to experiment, and some courts will learn from the mistakes
of others. Labor law will evolve through small steps, in a decentralized
trial-and-error process, at least in comparison to the time when the
likelihood of Supreme Court intervention was substantial.
The decentralized evolutionary process observed today is probably a
good thing for labor law doctrine.6 Under today's decentralized process,
there is a greater chance for federal courts to correct their own mistakes
over time, before the Supreme Court gets involved. If one appellate court
issues a decision that seems questionable in light of its incentive effects or
settled labor law doctrine, another appellate court has a high chance of
considering the same issue and avoiding the first court's error. As a
majority of circuits coalesce around the most defensible interpretation of the
statute, the first court (the one that issued the questionable decision) is
likely to reconsider its earlier decision. Indeed, as other circuits coalesce
around the more defensible interpretation of the statute, litigants will have
an incentive to challenge the interpretation of the first court in order to get
the first court to reverse itself.
Why should one consider it a good thing that the federal appellate
courts have a longer time to examine an issue before it goes up to the
Supreme Court? The reason is that the decentralized process produces more
information and tends to be narrowly tailored to the problem at hand.
Having more information is preferable in this context, because courts can
compare, in concrete cases, the effects of different conclusions on statutory
interpretation. With better information on effects in concrete cases, courts
are more likely to find the resolution that imposes the lowest costs on
management and labor. Another benefit of decentralized process is that
lower courts are likely to confine themselves to narrow holdings that apply
with surgical precision. The alternative process, in which the likelihood of
Supreme Court intervention is high, introduces the risk that the Supreme
Court will issue broad, sweeping decisions that upset the expectations of
management and labor with respect to many issues.
To be sure, this argument may seem to prove too much by suggesting
that Supreme Court intervention is a bad thing. The argument goes against
an article of faith among lawyers and law students that Supreme Court
intervention is always desirable. But this is a questionable proposition, in
spite of its general acceptance among law professors. Every court makes
mistakes, including the Supreme Court. We have a choice between two
processes; one that leads to Supreme Court intervention at a relatively high
rate, and the other that leads to Supreme Court intervention at a low rate. A
priori, it is not at all clear which process should be preferred.
6. See Hylton, Efficiency and Labor Law, supra note 1.
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The Supreme Court is always right, goes the saying, because its
judgment is final.' But serious students of law have to have a different
standard for deciding rightness. The standard implicit in this discussion is
minimizing the joint employment relationship costs of management and
labor-where costs are understood broadly to include incentive costs. 8 A
regime that minimizes wage costs, but robs workers of incentives to invest
in human capital would clearly be undesirable because of its incentive costs.
It follows that labor law serves a useful purpose to the extent it aids unions
in lowering some of the incentive costs of the employment relationship.
Interpretations of the statute that are consistent with this goal should be
considered "right" irrespective of the status of the deciding court.
Under the joint-cost minimization standard, the Supreme Court can
obviously make mistakes--even allowing for the finality of its decisions.
Moreover, it follows under this standard that the question about the
desirability of Supreme Court intervention requires a comparison of the
Supreme Court's rate of error with that of federal appellate courts. A high
rate of Supreme Court intervention (early and often) could be bad if the
Court's error rate is high, or no better than that of the average federal
appellate court. Allowing cases to percolate longer within federal courts
allows more time for those courts to correct their own mistakes, and for the
Supreme Court to gain more information, lowering its error rate, before
intervening.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF LAW FOR DECLINE

Many labor scholars have looked to the law as an instrument to prevent
or slow the decline of unions in the private sector. This is a quixotic
enterprise. The decline of unions is largely due to economic pressures that
the law can hardly control or withstand. Indeed, efforts to use the law to
prevent the decline of private-sector unions could easily backfire, hastening
the decline. For example, efforts to change the law to make it more difficult
for employers to question the majority status of a union could enhance
7. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."), reh'g

denied, 345 U.S. 946 (1952).
8. In particular, wage costs are not necessarily included in this objective. Wages, rather
than being "joint costs," are sums transferred between the employer and the employee. For
example, suppose the employee's compensation package is set in a manner that gives the
employee poor incentives to take care at work. The compensation package itself is just a
transfer between the employer and the employee. However, the reduction in both the
quantity and quality of output that results from the poorly-designed compensation package
is part of the joint cost of the employment relationship.
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employers' incentives to challenge the formation of unions in the first place,
generating further shrinkage among private-sector unions.
A. The Competition Tax
Assuming employers are rational, they will oppose unions as long as
having a union puts an employer at a serious competitive disadvantage
relative to a non-union competitor. The rational employer will make some
effort to determine the cost of the "competition tax" imposed by the union,
and will invest in an anti-union campaign up to the point where the
marginal dollar spent on the campaign just equals the expected competition
tax avoided. The larger the competition tax, the more employers will spend
on efforts to block the formation of unions. Moreover, the larger the
competition tax, the more likely employers will be to engage in unfair labor
practices in order to forestall unionization.
This theory suggests that employers should have devoted more
resources to blocking unionization as the economy has become more
competitive. This is also consistent with the claims of some labor scholars
that the reason unions have declined in the private sector is that employers
have adopted more hostile tactics in the face of union organizing. 9
However, the employer-hostility thesis runs into the problem that hostility,
carried to excess, is potentially costly to the employer-alienating and
driving away some of its most productive employees. As the market
becomes more competitive, the cost of employer hostility should increase,
just as the competition tax of unionism increases. These cost increases exert
opposing pressures on the employer.
Given the range of potential employer responses to union organization,
the rational employer would avoid the cost of employer hostility, and at the
same time minimize the risk of a union forming, by trying to ascertain
employee preferences and meet them-and these investments should be
made well before a union organization drive begins on the work site. Once
a union organization drive begins, a policy of aggressive hostility, divorced
from any effort to inform employees about the competitive effects of
unionization, would appear to be foolish for many employers.
My claim that increased competition should drive up the cost of
employer hostility is consistent with the data on union win rates in NLRB
certification elections. Since the mid 1970s, union win rates in NLRB
9. See Weiler, supranote 3. at 1769-70; Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom
of Contract and the Prospectsfor Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351 (1984);
Richard B. Freeman, Contractionand Expansion: The Divergence of PrivateSector and
Public Sector Unionism in the United States, 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 63, 79-86 (1988).
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certification elections have stood at a surprisingly consistent level of 50
percent. 0 Before then, the union win rate exceeded 50 percent, with a level
close 80 percent in 1940." In short, the union win rate declined steadily
from roughly 80 percent in 1940 to 50 percent in the mid 1970s, and then
remained at 50 percent up to the present.
What explains this pattern? If employer hostility motivated by
competitive pressure were the reason for the pre-1975 downward trend in
the union win rate, one would expect the win rate to continue declining after
1975. After all, domestic firms probably felt continuing, and increasing,
competitive pressure after the mid 1970s. To take one measure of
competitiveness as an example, the share of imported goods in the U.S.
economy continued to increase after 1975.12 One could argue that the data

on total NLRB certification elections held, the other line shown in Figure
2,"3 shows employer hostility because it is declines continually after 1970.
But the decline in total elections could just as easily be due to employer
efforts to make unionization unnecessary by meeting employee preferences,
or to a recognition by union organizers that the expected gains from
unionization in a competitive industry are not worth the costs.
What the data suggest is that in cases today in which employees clearly
prefer the union, say the level of support is 80 percent, employers are
generally caving in and voluntarily recognizing the union. Only the most
uncertain cases are going all the way to an election, and that is why the
outcome has been a consistent 50 percent-like a coin toss. The high win
rates observed from 1940 to the mid 1970s exhibit employer hostility
because employers over this period were forcing employees to go through
campaigns and elections even in cases in which the union clearly had
majority support. The union win rate data suggest that increasing
competitive pressure has dampened employer hostility, as a general rule,
after the filing of an election petition. Note that this is the reverse of the
belief that many labor scholars hold that the historical win rate pattern of
falling to 50 percent has resulted from increasing employer hostility. The
fall-to-50 percent pattern in the union election win rate is more consistent
with a decline in employer hostility, at least in the period after the filing of
an election petition.
It is surprising that no one has called attention to the consistent 50
10. See, e.g., FARBER & WESTERN, supra note 3 at 389; see also infra Figure 1.
11. Lipset & Katchanowski, supra note 2, at 19.
12. See, e.g., World Trade Organization: Merchandise Trade by region and selected
economies, 1980-2002, available at http://www.wto.org (accessed from homepage by
selecting Resources drop down menu, then Trade Statistics, and then under Historical Series
Section selecting Merchandise Trade Document) (last visited July 14, 2003).
13. FARBER & WESTERN, supra note 3, at 389.
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percent union win rate. The result is analogous to the consistent 50 percent
plaintiff win rate observed in trial courts. The 50 percent win rate observed
in general litigation is now understood, following the contribution of
George Priest and Benjamin Klein, to result from the selection of cases for
trial in the settlement process.' 4 Since cases that both parties know are

strong or weak are likely to be settled, only the most uncertain cases make
it all the way to judgment in court. The end result is a process that operates
like a coin toss. In the same sense, a rational employer-employee pair will
"settle" obviously weak and obviously strong cases-by the union
organizers decision not to file a petition for an election (weak case), by a
Board finding that the union lacks substantial support (weak case), or by the
employer caving in and recognizing the union (strong case). The end result
is that the recognition cases that go all the way to election are the most
uncertain. This explains the consistent 50 percent union election win rate.
The decline in total elections (Figure 1) reflects a different process
which cannot be analogized to the settlement process in trials. Rather, the
decision to petition for an election is analogous to the filing of a lawsuit.
Lawsuits are filed when the expected payoff, which is equal to the
probability of plaintiff victory multiplied by the expected award, exceeds
the plaintiff's cost of litigation. 5 Similarly, union election petitions are filed
when the expected payoff, which is the probability of union victory
multiplied by the expected gain, exceeds the cost of union organization and
maintenance. 6 Since the costs of organization and maintenance have not
increased, and indeed have likely fallen with the advent of the internet and
new communication technology, the decline in total elections observed in
Figure 1 must be due to an a reduction in the expected payoff from
unionization. The graph of total elections suggests that around 1970, the
expected payoff from unionization reached a high point and then started
falling. As I said before, this could be due to several factors in addition to
employer hostility.
One important feature of my claim regarding the union win rate is that
14. See George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation,13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). For an extension of the "Priest-Klein theorem" based on

asymmetric information, see Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information andthe Selection of
Disputesfor Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1993); see also Keith N. Hylton, An
Asymmetric Information Model of Litigation, 22 INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 153 (2002).
Under the asymmetric information hypothesis, the high pre-1975 union win rate could
reflect cases in which employers were simply unable to assess the degree of union support.
I find this explanation less plausible than one based on employer hostility.
15. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A TheoreticalAnalysis under
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
16. The same point is made by FARBER & WESTERN, supra note 3, at 41.
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it is falsifiable. If the claim that the 50 percent union election win rate
reflects the end product of a settlement process similar to that observed in
litigation is wrong, then it will be disproved over time, as we observe union
election win rates that move substantially above or below 50 percent.
B. Reform andthe Future
To be successful, a program of labor law reform that aims to slow the
decline of unions should attempt to reduce the perceived competition tax
associated with unions.' 8 This is difficult to do because most of the
competition tax probably results from contract provisions secured by unions
through the collective bargaining process. However, anyone familiar with
labor law should be aware of various pockets of the law in which the rules
exacerbate the competitive disadvantage of unionization.
The most important type of reform aiming to reduce the decline of
17. Lipset & Katchanovsky, supra note 2, at 19.
18. This general position differs greatly from that of former NLRB Chairman William
B. Gould, who offered several reform suggestions in his 1993 book. See GOULD, supra note
3, at 151-79. Most of Gould's reform proposals, however, would increase the competitive
disadvantage of unionization (e.g., increasing employer information disclosure requirements,
expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining, providing greater monetary relief to workers
in discriminatory discharge cases). Rather than increasing union representation, Gould's
proposals would probably reduce the private-sector union density if implemented.

2003]

FUTURE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICA

699

unions would address the "policy oscillation" problem.' 9 As every labor law
student knows, the Board's composition changes with every presidential
administration and even within a single administration. Given the five-year
terms of Board members, a one-term president could substantially change
its composition through new appointments. Although a policy of reserving
seats for the party out of power has been in place for a long time, this has
not been enough to prevent new Boards from overruling large parts of the
law handed down by previous Boards.
Policy oscillation has been a long standing feature, and it is arguably a
part of the statutory design. Some scholars have defended it on the ground
that it puts flexibility or "play" into the joints of labor law, allowing the
regulations to change as the nation's preferences changes-and as those
preferences are reflected in presidential elections.2" Because the law
changes as new administrations come into office, goes the argument, there
is less pressure to amend the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The
amendment process itself is costly, and it is difficult to predict its result. An
amended statute could be inferior in many respects to the original design.
The problem with oscillation by design is that it is fundamentally
inconsistent with the notion of labor law as law, in the sense of being a set
of predictable rules. Unpredictable law imposes enormous costs on
contracting parties. If the parties cannot predict with accuracy how the
courts will rule on their actions and contract provisions, they will have
incentives to stick to their most conservative contract offers. For contracting
parties, the "bid-ask" spread widens when the law is unpredictable, which
makes contract settlement more difficult and the terms more onerous to the
party in the weakest bargaining position. To take a concrete example,
suppose employers cannot predict whether the Board will hold that their
bargained-for contract terms violate the duty to bargain in good faith-i.e.,
section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA 2 -because they are below what the Board
thinks any self-respecting union would accept. An employer in this position
would protect itself against the risk of disappointment at the
Board-specifically, being in violation of section 8(a)(5)-by reducing its
wage and benefit offers to levels that effectively hedge against this risk.
This increases the cost of reaching a contract, and gives unions a factual
basis for believing that the employer is not seriously committed to the
bargaining process.
Policy oscillation should be seen as a problem that should be minimized
19. Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillationat the Labor Board A Plea for Rulemaking,
37 ADMIN. L. REv. 163 (1985).
20. Id. at 167.
21.29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000).
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in order to reduce the rate at which unions are declining. Since the statutory
reform process is costly and unpredictable, the most efficient method of
dampening policy oscillation is for the Board itself to adhere more closely
to a policy of stare decisis or for the appellate courts to force such a policy
onto the Board.
The Board is unlikely to adopt a policy of stare decisis on its own. Once
a policy of overruling without second thoughts sets into an institution, there
is no clear internal motivation to arrest it. Why should a new Board respect
the decisions of the immediate predecessor Board when the previous Board
did not respect the decision of its immediate predecessor? Indeed, forcing
current Board members to adhere to a policy of stare decisis could be
counterproductive, forcing them to jump quickly toward overruling prior
decisions in order to create a set of lasting precedents that would bind future
Boards.
The more likely route toward dampening oscillation is through the
federal appellate courts. Federal appellate courts should, in effect, push the
Board toward a stare decisis policy by forcing the Board to provide a
persuasive rationale for overruling earlier Board decisions. Federal courts
should adopt a rule requiring substantial justification in order to uphold
Board reversals of earlier Board policy.
A substantial justification rule is on its face inconsistent with the
Chevron doctrine,22 though that doctrine is arguably flexible enough to
accommodate such a rule. Under Chevron, a federal appellate court is
supposed to defer to the agency's interpretation of its own statute as long
as that interpretation is reasonable, within the agency's discretion, and
governing an issue that is not settled by the express terms of the statute.23
The Chevron rule seems to be defined to permit an agency such as the
Board to change its policies in line with new administrations.
Chevron may make sense in the familiar context in which an agency is
designed to set up rules regulating the conduct of individual firms within an
industry. For example, the Food and Drug Administration designs rules
governing sellers of drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices. Although some
allowance should be made for firms to rely on previously-issued agency
rules, it seems clear that courts should give such an agency leeway to update
its rules as new information comes in.
The labor context is different because it involves contracting parties,
and in this context the Chevron doctrine is far less defensible. In the labor
setting, the Board acts as a specialized court. It is setting up rules which
form the foundation for contracts. If the Board changes those rules, or
22. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
23. Id. at 844-45.
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adopts a policy under which those rules appear to be unstable, the costs of
contracting go up. Chevron-style deference on the part of federal appellate
courts is inappropriate in this setting. A new statutory interpretation adopted
by the Board should not be accepted by a federal court unless the Board can
show that the new interpretation is clearly preferable in terms of its
incentive effects on the parties. The rules of the game have to be set and
remain stable in order to encourage parties to accept the collective
bargaining process.
More generally, a reform of labor law to prevent the decline of unions
should make predictability an important priority. In addition to dampening
policy oscillation, the Board should avoid reviewing the substance of
contracts under section 8(a)(5). Except for a few special types of contract
provisions that go against the core goal of free choice as to bargaining
representative,24 the Board should quit the business of micro-managing
labor contracts.
The special types of contract provisions that the Board should continue
to view as inconsistent with the duty to bargain in good faith are those that
have the flavor of yellow dog contracts. At core, the NLRA seeks to protect
the employee's free choice as to bargaining agent. This extends to
protecting employees from agreeing to waive or sign away their right of
collective choice under the statute. Employer proposals that conflict with
this basic right should continue to be viewed as permissive topics of
bargaining, and in some cases as per se violations of the statute. For
example, a provision, similar to the one at issue in the Republic Aviation
case, in which the employee agrees not to speak or agitate in favor of
unionization, falls in this category. 6
The types of contract provisions that the Board should leave entirely to
the parties are those governing the substance of the contract. The
employer's proposal in McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB 27 falls in this
category. The employer, McClatchy, owner of a newspaper, proposed to the
union representing editorial and other employees that wages be determined
entirely by its determination of merit.28 The employer and union reached an
impasse and the employer implemented its final offer. 29 The union filed an
unfair labor practice charge on the ground that McClatchy's implementation
of its merit pay plan violated its duty to bargain over wages. 30 The Board
24. See generally Hylton, Minimum Terms, supra note 1.

25. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).

26. Id. at 795-96.
27. 131 F.3d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
28. Id. at 1027.

29. Id. at 1028.
30. Id.
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agreed3 and the D.C. Circuit eventually upheld the Board's decision.32
McClatchy is a striking example of a contract provision that seems to
have the effect of stripping the union of almost all of its power. The court
rhetorically suggested an extended version that gives the employer full
discretion as to all terms of employment and includes a no-strike clause.33
But the conflict between the union and the employer in McClatchy, and in
the court's rhetorical example, is simply a question of bargaining power. A
decision that seeks to enhance the union's bargaining power by requiring
some minimum substantive provision-e.g., a requirement that the
employer agree to some definite wage standard-does little in reality to
alter the balance of bargaining power, since the Board cannot insert itself
into the workplace as a monitor of every contract proposal, while making
the employment relationship more costly for the employer.
With the general aim of reducing the competition tax, I could propose
changes to several other areas of labor law-for example, the rules
governing waiver of certain statutory rights,34 the impasse rule,35 or the law
governing subcontracting and relocation decisions.36 But the two areas
examined to this point, policy oscillation and regulation of substantive
contract terms, are perhaps the most general problems confronting all
unionized workplaces. The problems in these areas are likely to be
anticipated by firms when they consider the costs of unionization.
V. CONCLUSION

It may seem inappropriate and inconsistent with the purpose of the
NLRA to lay out a program for the survival of unions that counsels courts
and legislatures to try to minimize the competition tax created by unions.
Isn't the purpose of unions to tax competition by cartelizing the labor
force? 37 While that may be one of the goals of unions, it is not a goal that
the law has to respect. Monopolization of product markets was declared
unlawful by the Sherman Act in 1890, and was disfavored by the common
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1037.
33. Id. at 1034.
34. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983) (requiring clear and
unmistakable waiver).
35. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
36. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (focusing on
subcontracting); First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (focusing on partial
closure). For discussion of these cases as areas of reform (from a perspective that differs
from this paper), see GOULD, supra note 3, at 178-79.
37. Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U CHI. L. REv. 988, 997

(1984).
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law long before that. Labor law has adopted some of the same antimonopolization principles-for example, the Mackay Radio rule allowing
permanent replacements of striking workers,3" and the rules governing
secondary boycotts. Both the survival of labor law and the survival of
private-sector unions depend on the law seeking to support unions in the
activities that serve the long-term interests of both firm owners and
employees. Labor law should avoid aiding cartelization for its own sake and
regulating the substantive terms of contracts. The law should limit itself to
protecting employee choice as to bargaining representative and facilitating
the union's role as guardian against employer opportunism in the bargaining
process.

38. The rule allowing replacement prevents an incumbent union from gaining
monopoly power over the pool of employees available to a particular employer. For the antimonopolization theory of Mackay Radio, see George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter,
ReplacingStriking Workers: The Law andEconomics ofApproach, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY'S 43RD ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 188 (Bruno Stein
ed., 1990).

